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THE NEED FOR A WARNING PRIOR
TO A WAIVER OF THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT
Over the years the United States Supreme Court has guarded
the citizen's rights under the fourth, fifth and sixth amendments.1
The judicial system has been quick to strike down a statute or pro-
cedure which has gnawed at the fundamental roots of our democratic
society. In the course of admonishing infractions, the Court has
given instructions to insure that repeated offenses will not occur.
The fifth amendment right to refrain from making self-incrim-
inating statements places the burden upon the prosecution to estab-
lish the guilt of an individual with evidence other than the accused's
own testimony. The sixth amendment right to counsel assures each
citizen the opportunity for representation in a criminal proceeding
which may deprive him of life, liberty or property. The Court hasprotected both fundamental rights in order to maintain high stan-
dards of justice.
An excellent example of the Court's protective efforts is the
decision of Miranda v. Arizona.2 Any citizen placed under custodial
interrogation must be advised of his rights under the fifth and sixth
amendments prior to such interrogation, otherwise exculpatory or
inculpatory statements will not be admissible in a criminal proceed-
1 U.S. CONST. amend. IV: "The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirma-
tion, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to
be seized."
U.S. CONST. amend. V: "No person ... shall be compelled in any criminal caseto be a witness against himself, nor deprived of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law .... "
U.S. CONST. amend. VI: "In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the
right ... to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence."
2 384 U.S. 436 (1966). This case held that "[Tihe prosecution may not use state-
ments, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of
the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to se-
cure the privilege against self-incrimination. By custodial interrogation, we mean
questioning initiated by law enforcement officials after a person has been taken into
custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom in any significant way. As for the pro-
cedural safeguards to be employed, unless other fully effective means are devised toinform accused persons of their right to silence and to assure a continuous opportunity
to exercise it, the following measures are required. Prior to any questioning, theperson must be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement hedoes make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the pres-
ence of an attorney, either retained or appointed. The defendant may waive effectua-
tion of these rights, provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelli-
gently." Id. at 444.
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ing against him.8 In Miranda the Supreme Court recognized that
when a person is cut off from familiar surroundings and confronted
by police authority, he is in such a heightened emotional state that
his rational abilities are impaired.4 Seeking to alleviate the pressure
placed upon the suspect due to the interrogative atmosphere, the
Court designed the Miranda warnings to inform the suspect that he
has certain rights which will be recognized by the court,
5 that the
police interrogators may not necessarily be acting in his best in-
terests,6 and that he has no duty to cooperate with the police
questioning.'
Prior to Miranda, the waiver of rights test was employed to de-
termine whether, in light of all the circumstances, the accused was
aware of his rights.8 The Supreme Court rejected this "special cir-
cumstance" test because it was too speculative. As a more precise
test for establishing a waiver, the Court chose to require the giving
of a warning.9
The fourth amendment seeks to protect the citizen's rights to
privacy and freedom from an unreasonable search and seizure. The
exclusionary rule of Mapp v. Ohio10 prohibits the introduction of
any evidence obtained as a result of a violation of the fourth amend-
ment. As yet the Supreme Court has not declared that a citizen must
be advised of his right to refuse consent to an otherwise illegal
search. Currently the fourth amendment waiver test is similar to the
pre-Miranda "special circumstance" test, that is, was the waiver
free, voluntary and intelligent in light of all the circumstances."
One can make an intelligent waiver of his fifth and sixth amend-
ment rights only after a clear explanation and consequent under-
standing of those rights.' 2 A waiver of the right to remain silent,
after Miranda, could be an "express statement that the individual is
willing to make a statement and does not want an attorney."' The
foregoing should be strictly construed when the suspect is answering
the questions posed by his interrogators. This waiver is valid only
3 Id.
4 Id. at 465.
5 Id. at 468.
6 Id. at 469.
7 Id. at 468.
8 Generally the circumstances considered were the age, intelligence and educa-
tional background of the suspect. Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433 (1958).
9 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 468-69 (1966).
10 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
11 Judd v. United States, 190 F.2d 649 (D.C. Cir. 1950); People v. Michael, 45
Cal. 2d 751, 290 P.2d 852 (1955).
12 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 476.
13 Id. at 475.
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if it was preceded by a warning that the suspect could remain silent
and could have an attorney present during the questioning. Such a
warning is the only effective means of protecting fifth and sixth
amendment rights.' 4
The lack of a warning requirement prior to the exercise of the
fourth amendment right differs from the general rule applicable to
the fifth and sixth amendments and thus raises the issue of a possible
violation of the fourteenth amendment due process clause.' 5
The purpose of this comment will be to demonstrate the valid-
ity of a theory requiring a fourth amendment pre-waiver warning.
A comparison is made between searches conducted with consent
under both California and federal procedure. Whereas California
courts adopt a less rigorous standard for a waiver in case of search,
the federal courts adhere more closely to the waiver conditions of
Miranda.
A citizen unconscious of his fourth amendment rights cannot
intelligently waive them. Rather he is merely acceding to the request
made by the police officer unaware of the import or the consequences
of his act. This form of waiver scarcely resembles the waiver prin-
ciples of Miranda. If a citizen were aware of his right, he could use
both his will and intellect, rather than his will alone, when giving
consent to an otherwise illegal search.
WAIVER OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
Fourth amendment rights are as fundamental and important as
those of the fifth and sixth amendments and "require no less know-
ing a waiver than do the Fifth and Sixth." 6 Neither state nor federal
officers should be able to invade a citizen's privacy unless they carry
a search warrant issued by a detached magistrate and based upon
probable cause supported by oath or affidavit.17 Searches made with
14 Id. at 467.
15 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV: "No state shall make or enforce any law which
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of the citizens of the United States; nor
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law .... "
16 United States v. Blalock, 255 F. Supp. 268, 269 (E.D. Pa. 1968).
17 CAL. PEN. CODE. § 1525 (West 1956): "A search warrant cannot be issued but
upon probable cause, supported by affidavit, naming or describing the person, and
particularly describing the property and the place to be searched."
FED. R. Cmm. P. 41(c) (1968): "A warrant shall issue only on affidavit sworn to
before the judge or commissioner and establishing grounds for issuing the warrant.
If the judge or commissioner is satisfied that grounds for the application exist or that
there is probable cause to believe that they exist, he shall issue a warrant identifying
the property and naming or describing the person or place to be searched."
19691
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the consent of the person searched,' in an emergency situation to
prevent the destruction of evidence, 19 and those incident to a lawful
arrest ° encompass the full range of exceptions to this rule.
Consent never enters into the emergency situation where the
primary purpose is to prevent the destruction of evidence.21 In the
situation of a search incident to a lawful arrest, the search becomes
illegal when the officer exceeds the permissible scope of the search.
Beyond that point the consent of the suspect is necessary before the
officer can continue the search, unless the officer procures a search
warrant from a magistrate. It is in these consent search cases that
the waiver of the fourth amendment is in issue.
Consent searches are usually requested in one of three situa-
tions, when a search warrant cannot be issued; when a lawful arrest
cannot be made; or when a lawful arrest is made and the search re-
quested cannot be justified as incidental thereto. In any case, asking
a citizen to consent to an otherwise illegal search is equivalent to
asking him to forego his constitutional right to have a magistrate
determine whether probable cause exists to justify that search.2
The courts prefer the issuance of a warrant from a detached
magistrate and look with disfavor upon a consent search. "Every
reasonable presumption" is indulged against waiver; the courts will
not acquiesce in the loss of fundamental rights.2"
In Johnson v. Zerbst,21 the Supreme Court defined a waiver as
"ordinarily an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a
known right or privilege. ' 25 Implicit in this definition is the necessity
for rational judgment and the total awareness of all reasonable con-
sequences of a waiver.26 Otherwise, the definition would be mean-
ingless.
Prior to an otherwise valid waiver of the fifth and sixth amend-
ment rights, a warning must be given for the purpose of making the
person aware of those rights. This is an absolute prerequisite to an
intelligent decision to waive them.28 There is no justification for not
applying the same standard to an intelligent waiver of the right to
refuse consent to an otherwise illegal search.
18 Zap v. United States, 328 U.S. 624 (1946).
19 Warden, Maryland Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
20 United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950).
21 Warden, Maryland Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
22 Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948).
23 Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1937).
24 Id. at 458.
25 Id. at 464.
26 Id. at 465.
27 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 468 (1966).





The courts generally base their theory of consent to search on
a case by case factual analysis. In People v. Michael,29 police officers
questioned the defendant at her home concerning her use of nar-
cotics. The suspect's mother then voluntarily produced a small vial
stating that it contained all the drugs that her daughter had in the
house. The police sought and received a verbal consent from the de-
fendant to, search a nearby bedroom. The court held that in light of
all the circumstances the consent was free and voluntary, since to
hold otherwise would unreasonably hamper police activities.3" To
object to the search, the person need not "[F] orcibly resist an offi-
cer's assertion of authority. . . ."" But at the same time, if he freely
consents or produces evidence of his own free will, it cannot be said
that his constitutional rights have been violated nor that the search
was unreasonable.32
The test, then, is whether the consent is given freely and volun-
tarily in light of all the circumstances. Guidelines are difficult to
develop since the circumstances can vary widely in each case. Nor
can one develop concrete maxims for weighing the many elements
which the trier of fact must consider. Consent is a question of fact.
Therefore the decision made by the trier of fact upon the validity
of an alleged waiver is reversible only at the appellate level in cases
where the error is obvious or the evidence is insufficient. Thus the
trier of fact bears the burden of deciding a constitutional issue hav-
ing grave repercussions which would be considerably lessened, how-
ever, if the presence or absence of a warning were considered.
Clearly this would facilitate the determination of whether a knowl-
edgeable waiver was in fact made.
The Verbal Response of the Consenting Party
Absent circumstances of duress or coercion, the courts consider
the suspect's verbal response a primary factor in determining the
validity of consent. 3 A verbal consent to search weighs heavily with
the appellate court in deciding whether the consent was voluntarily
29 45 Cal. 2d 751, 290 P.2d 852 (1955).
80 Id. at 754, 290 P.2d at 854.
31 Id. at 753, 290 P.2d at 854.
32 Id. at 753, 290 P.2d at 853-54.
3 See People v. Shelton, 60 Cal. 2d 740, 388 P.2d 665, 36 Cal. Rptr. 433 (1964);
People v. Burke, 47 Cal. 2d 45, 301 P.2d 241 (1956); People v. Bustamonte, 270
A.,C.A. 707, 76 Cal. Rptr. 17 (1969); People v. Roberts, 246 Cal. App. 2d 715, 55 Cal.
Rptr. 62 (1967); People v. Justiniano, 236 Cal. App. 2d 542, 46 Cal. Rptr. 333 (1965).
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givena 4 Therefore it is often difficult to convince the fact finder that
the person did not mean what he said. However if Miranda-like
warnings were required and given, the trier of fact would have a
better indication that the waiver was voluntary and intelligent.
Nevertheless, California chooses not to impose the need for a warning
but relies upon the "scrutiny of the voluntariness of the consent
'3 5
as more protection than the recital of a warning by the police. The
necessity of a warning would not only facilitate the trial court's
analysis of the consent issue, but would also assure the defendant a
meaningful opportunity to exercise his constitutional rights by lay-
ing a foundation for an intelligent waiver. 6
Submission to Police Authority
Submission to police authority weighs most heavily of all cir-
cumstances against a finding of an intelligent waiver. In People v.
Dahlke,87 the defendant was arrested, handcuffed and taken to the
police station. While emptying the contents of his pockets, the de-
fendant displayed a set of car keys. The police asked him if he had
any objection to a search of his car. He replied, "Do what you
want." 8 The court held this to be a free and voluntary consent and
not a submission to authority. In contrast stands Castenada v.
Superior Court,3 9 where all present were lawfully arrested for pos-
session of narcotics. The police asked the defendant if he had any
more narcotics at another address. When the defendant inquired
whether they had a search warrant, the police replied that there
would be no need for one if he would consent. The court held the
subsequent verbal consent, "Go ahead," 4 to be involuntarily given
and a submission to authority.
The difference between the two cases is that in Castenada, the
evidence tended to show that the defendant knew of his right to
have a magistrate determine the existence of probable cause. But in
Dahlke, there was no mention of the defendant's awareness of this
constitutional right. Defendant in Castenada consented involuntarily
because he knew his rights but eventually succumbed to pressure.
Consent was voluntary in Dahlke only because defendant in his
limited awareness allowed the officers to do exactly what they re-
quested. In Castenada, the defendant's awareness of the need for a
34 Supra, note 28.
85 People v. Beal, 268 Cal. App. 2d 481, 485, 73 Cal. Rptr. 787, 790 (1969).
36 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 475 (1966).
87 257 Cal. App. 2d 82, 64 Cal. Rptr. 599 (1968).
88 Id. at 85, 64 Cal. Rptr. at 602.
89 59 Cal. 2d 439, 380 P.2d 641, 30 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1965).
40 Id. at 441, 380 P.2d at 642, 30 Cal. Rptr. at 2.
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search warrant was a determinative factor in finding that his consent
was involuntarily given. Yet the absence of this awareness in Dahke
was not important to prove the voluntary character of consent.41
Under such rulings the hardened criminal, who had learned his rightsthrough bitter experience, would find himself in a better position
than would the relatively innocent first offender. The injustice of
such a result is patent.
California's interpretation of submission to authority requires
that the individual first do something affirmative to indicate his re-luctance to cooperate with the police. This affirmative act may be a
request for a search warrant,4 2 repeated denials of guilt,4" attempts
to mislead the police in procuring evidence 4 or prior evasion of
arrest.45 But whatever the activity, it must be positioned againstpolice authority. Such a viewpoint fails to recognize that in some
situations, because of fear, respect or excitability, a person may
either fail to object or remain completely silent, thereby impliedly
waiving his right to object.46 Thus in Dahlke, the defendant could
easily have been so frightened that he didn't even consider refusing
consent. If so, this inaction would be a passive submission to author-ity and should be an equally valid reason for the court to find that
the consent given was neither voluntary nor free.
The totality of circumstances test allows for too much specula-
tion regarding whether or not a person consented intelligently as
well as voluntarily. Any doubt as to an effective waiver could be
significantly reduced if a person were informed of his right to refuse
consent to an otherwise illegal search. Furthermore, one would cer-
tainly feel less compelled to acquiesce to a warrantless search if he
knew of his right to refuse.
The California courts do not specifically require that a waiverbe intelligent. They are thus partially inconsistent with the SupremeCourt's definition of waiver as an "intentional relinquishment or
abandonment of a known right or privilege. ' 47 The federal courts
require that any waiver of the fourth amendment must be free,
voluntary and intelligent in light of all the circumstances.48 A fewfederal courts go so far as to require that a warning be given to
41 People v. Dahlke, 257 Cal. App. 2d 82, 64 Cal. Rptr. 599 (1968).42 Castenada v. Superior Court, 59 Cal. 2d 439, 380 P.2d 641, 30 Cal. Rptr. 1
(1965).
43 People v. Currier, 232 Cal. App. 2d 103, 42 Cal. Rptr. 562 (1965).
44 Id.
45 People v. Vasquez, 256 Cal. App. 2d 342, 63 Cal. Rptr. 885 (1967).46 But cf. Lane v. Superior Court, 271 A.C.A. 933, 76 Cal. Rptr. 895 (1969).
47 Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1937).48 Judd v. United States, 190 F.2d 649 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
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assure that the waiver is intelligent.49 This view recognizes the
reality that some citizens, when faced with police authority, are not
in a position to make a rational or intelligent decision. Thus the
federal courts usually require that the individual be aware of his
rights and choose not to assert them while realizing the consequences
of that decision.5
FEDERAL WAIVER
The federal courts' approach to waiver of fourth amendment
rights emphasizes the importance of a citizen's awareness of his con-
stitutional right to be free from an unreasonable search and seizure.
These courts utilize the three part test expressed in Judd v. United
States.5 The consent given must be free and intelligent,
52 specific
and unequivocal, 8 and uncontaminated by duress or coercion, actual
or implied.54 By delineating the three specific elements needed for
a waiver to be constitutionally valid, the federal courts have promul-
gated a basic outline which the trier of fact can use. The specificity
of the federal test contrasts with the amorphous test of the Califor-
nia courts, asking whether the waiver was free and voluntary in light
of all the circumstances. The two approaches do not differ in sub-
stance, for the elements of the federal test are implicit in the Cal-
ifornia test. The difference is rather a matter of emphasis, with the
federal courts stressing the factor of intelligence and the California
courts stressing the factor of voluntariness.
The Waiver Must Be Free and Intelligent
The requirement that a waiver be free and intelligent is a pre-
requisite to a constitutionally valid consent. In United States v.
Page,51 federal narcotics agents, without probable cause to arrest,
interviewed the defendant and asked to search the premises after
telling the suspect that he had a right to refuse. The court held that
consent was free and intelligent.50 Not all federal cases are decided
on the presence or absence of a pre-waiver warning, yet the element
of rational understanding is implicit throughout the federal approach.
9 United States v. Nikrasch, 367 F.2d 740 (7th Cir. 1966); United States v.
Blalock, 255 F. Supp. 268 (E.D. Pa. 1966).
5o United States v. Vickers, 387 F.2d 703 (4th Cir. 1967); Cipres v. United
States, 343 F.2d 95 (9th Cir. 1965) ; Canida v. United States, 250 F.2d 822 (5th Cir.
1958) ; United States v. Wallace, 272 F. Supp. 841 (S.D. N.Y. 1963).
51 190 F.2d 649 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
52 Id. at 651.
583 Id.
54 id.
55 302 F.2d 81 (9th Cir. 1962).
56 Id. at 83.
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In Cipres v. United States,57 defendant, suspected of importing
marijuana, was stopped at an airport terminal and asked if her suit-
case could be searched. Her response, "Yes, I have nothing tohide," '58 was in itself insufficient to conclude that her consent wasintelligent. The court said that the consent must have "reflected an
understanding, uncoerced and unequivocal election to grant the
officers a license which the person knows may be freely and effec-
tively withheld."" a The Cipres reasoning parallels the Supreme Court
view of waiver and closely resembles the language of Miranda. If aperson waives this fundamental constitutional right, the trial court
must find that he was aware of the viable alternative of refusing
consent. Spoken words alone may indicate a valid consent but whenlinked to other latent circumstances, the opposite conclusion is
possible.6"
The Waiver Must Be Specific and Unequivocal
Inherent in the requirement that the waiver be free and intel-ligent is the requirement that it be specific and unequivocal.61 InUnited States v. Minor,62 federal revenue agents suspected the de-fendant of operating an illegal distillery. They went to the defen-dant's home and knocked on the door. Instead of admitting the
agents, the defendant spoke with them outside. The agents threat-
ened that they could get a search warrant but still requested per-
mission to search the premises. Defendant acquiesced, "Well, it'sthere, I guess you might just as well know it."6 The court held the
waiver to be involuntary because the prosecution failed to prove
that the consent was specific and unequivocal.64
An ambiguous reply does not give an officer the absolute rightto search. Even though a person admits to the presence of damaging
evidence, he can still demand a search warrant.6 5 The federal courts
are prone to discourage federal officers from exercising their often
biased judgment in these matters.66
57 343 F.2d 95 (9th Cir. 1965).
58 Id. at 97.
69 Id.
60 Weed v. United States, 340 F.2d 827 (10th Cir. 1965).61 Channel v. United States, 285 F.2d 217 (9th Cir. 1960).
62 117 F. Supp. 697 (E.D. Okla. 1953).
03 Id. at 698.
64 Id.65 Higgins v. United States, 209 F.2d 819 (D.C. Cir. 1954). "But no sane man
who denies his guilt would actually be willing that policemen search his room forcontraband which is certain to be discovered." Id. at 820.66 United States v. Arrington, 215 F.2d 630 (7th Cir. 1954). "[Ilt is high timethat courts place their stamp of disapproval upon this increasing practice of federalofficers searching a home without a warrant on the theory of consent, particularlywhere no reason is shown why a search warrant was not obtained. The protection
1969]
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The Waiver Must Be Uncontaminated by Duress or Coercion
The great majority of federal cases is decided by balancing an
intelligent and free waiver with the requirement that it be given
without duress or coercion. This third element of the federal test is
similar to the California concept of submission to authority. Appar-
ently the federal courts realize that submission to authority is often
not only the unsuccessful resistance of police authority, but also
frequently a passive unwillingness to assert a right in the presence
of police authority.
In United States v. Shropshire,7 the defendant went to the door
expecting to see a friend but instead five policemen confronted him.
The court found the officers' imposing presence coupled with the de-
fendant's surprise to be impliedly coercive, thus nullifying the con-
sent to search. The person consenting must come to a decision
independent of any actual or implied pressure exerted by the pres-
ence of police authority."" However, if the person consenting is, for
example, an articulate businessman,"" it is not likely that he would
easily be cowed into consenting contrary to his wishes.
70 A federal
court has held that consent given by such a person is free despite an
element of possible duress or coercion.
7 Therefore, police exertion
of duress is not regarded as controlling.
2
The police practice of presenting alternatives hostile to the
person's best interests is also criticized by the courts. A choice be-
tween coerced consent or a ransacking of the premises under the
guise of a search warrant is not an intelligent and voluntary choice.
73
The choice in a consent-search situation should be between coopera-
tion and non-cooperation.74
Bifurcation of the consent into the elements of freedom and
intelligence on the one hand, and the absence of duress and coercion
on the other, is the recurrent theme of the federal holdings in this
afforded by the Fourth Amendment should not be made dependent upon 
the probity
of the officer to justify a search on consent. Otherwise the rights guaranteed to the
citizen by the Amendment will be impaired so as to become little more 
than an empty
gesture." Id. at 637.
67 271 F. Supp. 521 (E.D. La. 1967).
68 Pekar v. United States, 315 F.2d 319 (5th Cir. 1963).
69 United States v. Martin, 176 F. Supp. 262 (S.D. N.Y. 1959).
70 See also Tatum v. United States, 321 F.2d 219 (9th Cir. 1963). In this case,
the defendant's being a private detective prevented the court from holding 
that
he was coerced into consenting by policemen. The court felt that it was unlikely 
that
one so accustomed to policemen could be so easily coerced.
71 United States v. Martin, 176 F. Supp. 262 (S.D. N.Y. 1959).
72 Id.
73 United States v. Waldron, 219 F.2d 37 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
74 United States v. Mason, 290 F. Supp. 843 (D. N.H. 1968); United States v.
Gross, 137 F. Supp. 244 (S.D. N.Y. 1956).
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area. In the final decision, both the intellect and the will of the per-
son consenting must operate in order to waive the constitutional
right. The suspect must have viable alternatives and must not be
coerced into consenting for fear of reprisal. The intellect must de-
cipher the logic and reasoning of the will's determination. Further-
more, a showing must be made that the suspect's consideration of
the various consequences was tantamount to a wilful and knowledge-
able waiver.
THE NEED FOR A PRE-WAIVER WARNING
After Miranda, the procedural safeguards of criminal law
tended more toward preserving constitutional rights than toward re-
stricting state police activities. The focus shifted to the citizen rather
than the policeman. Miranda's purpose was the preservation of the
citizen's dignity by advising him of his right to refrain from self-incrimination and his right to counsel during custodial interroga-
tion.7" When the authorities restrain a person's freedom in any
significant manner, they must apprise him of his fifth and sixth
amendment rights.7 " An analogous situation exists when an officer,during the interrogation of an individual, requests permission to
search a given locality which is under that individual's control. Thequestion is again whether that individual must be informed of his
right to refuse consent prior to a waiver, just as an individual mustbe informed of his right to remain silent and his right to counsel
prior to an intelligent waiver.
The courts divide distinctly on this issue. The California courts
state that there is no absolute requirement that an officer advise a
citizen of his right to refuse consent to a search. One group offederal courts substantially agrees with this viewpoint.7 Anothergroup takes an approach which is diametrically opposed and requires
that a warning be given before any finding of an intelligent waiver.79
The California Approach
The controversy began in California with the vigorous dissent
of Justice Kingsley in People v. Campuzano. ° Police officers went to
75 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 457 (1966).
76 Id. at 444.
77 People v. Stark, 275 A.C.A. 782, 80 Cal. Rptr. 307 (1969); People v. Fuller,268 A.C.A. 909, 74 Cal. Rptr. 488 (1969); People v. Baker, 267 Cal. App. 2d 916,73 Cal. Rptr. 455 (1969); People v. Cirilli, 265 Cal. App. 2d 607, 71 Cal. Rptr. 604(1968) ; People v. Chaddock, 249 Cal. App. 2d 483, 57 Cal. Rptr. 582 (1967).78 Gorman v. United States, 380 F.2d 158 (1st Cir. 1967).
71 United States v. Nikrasch, 376 F.2d 740 (7th Cir. 1966); United States v.
Blalock, 255 F. Supp. 268 (E.D. Pa. 1966).80 254 Cal. App. 2d 52, 61 Cal. Rptr. 695 (1967).
1969]
SANTA CLARA LAWYER
a business establishment suspected of narcotics traffic. With the per-
mission of the owner, they searched the premises and found heroin
among the belongings of the defendant employee. The police
arrested and handcuffed the defendant and asked permission to
search his home for more narcotics. The defendant verbally con-
sented. The majority held the consent to be free and voluntary since
the defendant, apparently of his own choice, acquiesced in the re-
quest. Justice Kingsley maintained that since the defendant was un-
der custodial interrogation as described in Miranda, he should have
been warned of his fourth amendment rights, and the search was
therefore unreasonable. He also noted that "[T]he importance of
warning a suspect of his constitutional right to object to a search
[under the circumstances of arrest] is even greater where police in-
terrogation is to follow.""' There were clear and sufficient grounds
for obtaining a search warrant without hampering effective law en-
forcement since the defendant was in custody and could not destroy
the evidence sought.82
The specific issue of the need for a pre-waiver warning was
argued in People v. Chaddock.8 Police questioned a felon parolee
about a recent robbery where a description given of the car used in
the robbery matched that of the defendant's car. The police found
a gun in the trunk of his car. Its possession, unknown to the de-
fendant, was a violation of his parole and he was arrested. Defen-
dant's reply, "Certainly," 84 in response to a request by the officers
to search his car was held to reflect a free and voluntary consent
since the defendant, a prior felon, was cooperative at all times with
the police. The argument that a warning should have been given was
flatly rejected on the theory that a request to search implies an
opportunity to ref use.
85
Abstractly, this reasoning may be valid; but in actuality it
begins to crumble. Although the inference of an opportunity to re-
fuse is present, such inference is not a clear-cut fact. A felon on
parole, fearing police reprisal, would be likely to forego any exercise
of his rights. The uneducated and the timid would probably prefer
cooperation to a possible adverse reaction from the police. For
these reasons, a suspect should be apprised of his fourth amend-
ment rights prior to waiver. An awareness of such rights should
not turn in any degree on education, bravery, or self-confidence.
81 Id. at 61, 61 Cal. Rptr. at 701.
82 Id. at 62, 61 Cal. Rptr. at 702.
83 249 Cal. App. 2d 483, 57 Cal. Rptr. 582 (1967).
84 Id. at 484, 57 Cal. Rptr. at 583.
85 Id. at 485, 57 Cal. Rptr. at 584.
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The right to be free from an unreasonable search and seizure is
available to all, not only those who are emotionally and intellec-
tually able to assert it.
The California view respecting waiver of the fourth amend-
ment rights seems analomous when compared to past decisions on
waiver of other constitutional rights. The court in People v. Dora-do,8  a forerunner of Miranda v. Arizona,"7 considered it necessary
to protect the citizen's right to refrain from self-incrimination longbefore the Supreme Court decided the issue in Miranda. Dorado
noted with approval the Johnson v. Zerbst definition of waiver88
and stated that unless evidence were introduced showing the de-fendant was aware of his sixth amendment rights, "[T] he failure ofthe officers to inform him of that right would preclude a finding thathe knowingly waived it,"89 since the defendant could not waive what
he did not know.
The status of the law in California is that one cannot waive the
rights afforded by the fifth and sixth amendments without first being
made aware of those rights.9 0 This is true regardless of his age,
education or background." There is no requirement, however, that
a person be informed of his fourth amendment rights prior to their
waiver despite its equally fundamental character.9 Apparently inCalifornia, the law is satisfied that a person is aware of his right to
refuse merely from the doubtful implication of his consent to a re-quest, when, in fact, there may be no such awareness at all.
Since Miranda and Dorado, there can be no presumption ofawareness of fifth and sixth amendment rights absent a warning. By
analogy, in the case of waiver of consent to search, there should be
no presumption of awareness of fourth amendment rights without
a warning.
The Gorman Approach
Certain federal courts rejecting the need for a specific warning
agree with the basic California position. In Gorman v. United
86 62 Cal. 2d 338, 398 P.2d 361, 42 Cal. Rptr. 169 (1965).
87 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
88 See text accompanying note 23 supra.89 People v. Dorado, 62 Cal. 2d 338, 352, 398 P.2d 361, 370, 42 Cal. Rptr. 169,
178 (1965).90 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); People v. Dorado, 62 Cal. 2d 338,
398 P.2d 361, 42 Cal. Rptr. 169 (1965).91 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) where the special circumstances
test is rejected.
92 Supra, note 77.
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States,98 federal officers arrested the defendant for a narcotics
offense. Incident to that arrest, they searched him and found a rent
receipt from a nearby motel. The police took him to the station
house, advised him of his rights under Miranda and interrogated
him concerning a recent robbery, In the course of questioning, the
officers sought permission to search the motel room and the defen-
dant verbally consented. The court held this consent to be voluntary
and intelligent since after being advised of his fifth and sixth amend-
ment rights, the defendant knew he had no duty to cooperate with
the officers.94 Defense counsel argued by analogy to Miranda that
the defendant should also have been advised of his right to refuse to
consent to the otherwise illegal search. The court recognized the
"surface plausibility" of the theory but rejected it because to warn
the suspect of his fourth amendment rights would be a "mechanistic
duplication" downgrading the effect of the Miranda warnings.
95
Furthermore, the court noted that the law of search and seizure is
not concerned with unreliability of confessions or self-incrimination
or the right to counsel at all critical stages but rather with the
"maintenance of civilized police practice."96
Since the Gorman court feared downgrading of the Miranda
warnings if another were given it relied on those warnings to encom-
pass a fourth amendment warning. Using a theory similar to the
"inference of refusal" in California, the court found a fourth amend-
ment warning implicit in the fifth amendment warning. It reasoned
that defendant should have known that anything found in the
search could be used in a criminal proceeding 
against him.9 7
This theory was held to be untenable in United States v.
Moderacki,9s which criticized the Gorman interpretation of the
Miranda warnings. "The key to a voluntary waiver," the court
said, "is whether it was done knowingly. An inference that a person
has been warned is not one and the same thing as an actual warn-
ing.') 99
Moderacki also rejected the notion that an additional fourth
amendment warning would be a "mechanistic duplication."
100 It con-
93 380 F.2d 18 (1st Cir. 1967).
94 Id. at 164.
95 Id. It is difficult to see how an additional warning about a different 
right
would downgrade the Miranda warnings as is contended in this 
objection. The
probable effect of a triple warning encompassing the fourth, fifth and 
sixth amendments
would be to make the suspect more fully aware of all of them.
96 Id.
97 Id.
98 280 F. Supp. 633 (D. Del. 1968).
99 Id. at 630,
100 Id,
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ceded that the warning would be repetitive since it would be similar
to the Miranda warnings but emphasized that "[L] acking an explicit
warning as to his rights under the Fourth amendment, it can never
be known with certainty whether a defendant voluntarily waived
those rights."''
Although the rights guaranteed by the fourth, fifth, and sixth
amendments differ, standards for waiver should be the same for all.
To require a lesser standard for the fourth amendment than for the
fifth and sixth derogates the equally fundamental character of the
fourth amendment.
The purpose of the fourth amendment, according to Gorman,
is to maintain civilized police practices. Today, however, its primary
purpose is protection of the personal rights of the citizen. 02 As early
as 1886, the Supreme Court said in Boyd v. United States,'10 3 "It is
not the breaking of his doors, and the rummaging of his drawers,
that constitutes the essence of the offense [of an unreasonable
search and seizure]; but it is the invasion of his indefeasible right
of personal security, personal liberty and private property .... M04
The fourth amendment protects the personal right of privacy rather
than the physical premises. 105 The maintenance of civilized police
practices is not in itself the end sought by the fourth amendment,
but rather it is a reasonable means toward achieving a meaningful
respect for a person's right of privacy, the primary goal of the
fourth amendment.
The Blalock Rule
The court in Moderacki based its decision on two federal cases,
United States v. Nikrascz' 6 and United States v. Blalock,' which
were the first to state that a specific warning is needed to intel-
ligently waive the right to refuse an otherwise illegal search and
seizure. Nikrasck indicated by way of dictum that although the
prosecution failed to argue the point on appeal, the defendant could
not have knowingly waived his right without a warning. 08 In Bla-
lock, three FBI agents encountered the defendant in his hotel lobby.
After identifying themselves and briefly questioning him, one agent
took the defendant to the men's room and frisked him for weapons.
101 Id.
102 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
103 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
104 Id. at 630.
105 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
106 376 F.2d 740 (7th Cir. 1966).
107 255 F. Supp. 268 (E.D. Pa. 1966).
108 United States v. Nikrasch, 376 F.2d 740, 744 (7th Cir. 1966).
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The defendant and all three agents then went to the defendant's
room. There the agents advised the defendant of his rights under
Miranda and questioned him about a recent robbery. The defendant
denied any connection with that offense. The agents then said that
if this were true, he should have no objection to a search of the
room. Agreeing with this reasoning, he consented to the search.
The court held this waiver to be unintelligent. An intelligent
consent implies that the suspect is aware of his rights. One can in-
telligently waive a right only if one knows of that right, but cannot
waive rights of which he is unaware. 109
Although the Blalock decision preceded Gorman, the court dis-
cussed the same objections raised in the later case. Blalock con-
cluded that the requirement of a warning would not be a burden to
police officers or an obstruction to criminal investigation."" The
main thrust of the decision was that the fourth, fifth and sixth
amendments are of equal dignity and should be enforced with the
same constitutional strictness."' To inform the defendant of his
right to counsel and the right to remain silent but not to warn him
of his right to refuse an otherwise illegal search is a failure to recog-
nize this equality. Since it is equally fundamental with respect to
waiver, " [T] he Fourth amendment requires no less knowing a waiver
than do the Fifth and Sixth."" 2 A warning of each individual right
is a prerequisite to a valid waiver of any one right in order "to pro-
tect the possibility that the ignorant may surrender their rights more
readily than the shrewd.""1
3
Blalock is consistent with the constitutional interpretations of
a valid waiver that are expressed in Miranda. A warning respecting
fourth amendment rights is necessary to insure that all citizens, re-
gardless of age, education, or background have a more meaningful
opportunity to enjoy their constitutional rights. If a warning were
required with the same strictness as that provided in Miranda, some-
one who would otherwise be convicted might go free. "[B]ut it is
the law that sets him free. Nothing can destroy a government more
quickly than its failure to observe its own laws, or worse, to disre-
gard the charter of its own existence.""' 4 The purpose of requiring
a warning is not to hamper police activity but rather to attempt to
assure each citizen his full compliment of constitutional rights. To
recognize each citizen's right to refuse consent to an unlawful search
109 United States v. Blalock, 255 F. Supp. 268, 269 (E.D. Pa. 1966).




114 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 at 659.
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yet at the same time to fail to advise him of that right blunts the
thrust of the fourth amendment.
CONCLUSION
To hold that one may waive his right to be free from an un-
reasonable search and seizure without being aware of that right is
contrary to the standards of due process." 5 Such an approach vi-
olates the basic concept that a fundamental right should not be so
easily lost. A warning respecting the fourth amendment should be
required so that all citizens, prior to their relinquishment of a con-
stitutional right, are aware of that right and the consequences of its
abandonment. If a sovereign state chooses to reject the requirement
of a specific warning, it should assure by other means that a de-
fendant is aware of his right to refuse an unreasonable search and
seizure.
However, to give a pre-waiver fourth amendment warning is
not burdensome in light of the rights involved. The United States
Justice Department apparently does not feel that a warning burdens
or interferes with its activities. In its search and seizure manual, the
point is clearly made that when the officer requests a search he must
"[E] xplain to the individual that he is not required to consent and
... make him aware that any evidence found may be used against
him."' " There is no reason to believe that the burden on the states
would be more severe.
Joseph C. Sanfilippo
115 Cf. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372
U.S. 335 (1963); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
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